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MiSCONCePtiONS iN RelAtiON tO tHe 
MOtiveS BeHiND “lOCAl MONey” 
iNitiAtiveS
With the vast majority of local monies around the world the 
need for introducing the instruments intended as money 
substitutes is explained with one or all of the following 
reasons:
•   the  traditional  monetary  intermediary  system  (that  is: 
credit institutions and other traditional financial service 
providers) is unsuitable for adequately serving local 
communities, as they “disregard local interests”;
•   the traditional financial system serves the interests of 
the global economy, and serves primarily these interests, 
which is in conflict with the interests of the local 
economy, and this calls for the establishment of a local 
monetary system; 
•   economies are characterised by an “inadequate supply of 
money”, which is particularly detrimental to local 
communities, and also calls for the establishment of new 
monetary instruments;
•   Monetary  instruments  used  as  traditional  money  bear 
interest, resulting in less-than-optimal circulation of 
money in economies − interest supports the accrual of 
wealth, thereby undermining economic growth;
•   trade  between  far-away  regions  (globalisation)  is 
detrimental as globalisation serves local demand to the 
detriment of local businesses, thus generating 
unemployment in the region.
The theoretical results in modern economics (also supported 
by the practical experience of several decades) suggest that 
none of the above economic arguments have any merits, as 
the evaluation of the underlying situation and the causal 
relationship suggested by them are both wrong.
Financial intermediation in modern market economies 
based on private wealth is performed by a large number of 
financial institutions also privately owned. These institutions 
are operated in all countries under separate legislation with 
a view to ensuring that clients’ interests and claims are 
protected under the law; to avoiding bank failures and 
other financial crises the type of which emerged at the 
dawn of modern economies; or to ensure the possibility of 
managing them. Compliance with applicable regulations 
pertaining to all market actors alike are supervised in most 
countries by separate institutions performing financial 
supervision.
Modern monetary systems based on credit cannot find 
themselves in situations of shortage of money in the 
economy as described above in oversimplified terms. One 
of the reasons lies in the fact that interrelations and terms 
on commodity standard money systems quite simply do not 
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have any relevance in monetary systems based on credit.1  
Monetary systems based on credit have replaced commodity 
standards (mostly based on precious metals) with the very 
aim of enabling economic actors to create money for 
themselves in a more flexible way, in the amounts necessary 
for effecting economic transactions. In modern monetary 
systems based on credit, money is not “created” by a 
central actor; therefore it is not in a position to issue money 
in “wrong amounts”.
It goes without saying that situations characterised by 
shortage of credit may occur, which however means that 
private economy actors encounter (either due to a global or 
a national economic recession or crises) a fragility or a 
deterioration in mutual confidence. For this reason, they 
are much less inclined to extend credit to one another (e.g. 
extending credit on the part of commercial banks and 
accepting delayed payment of invoiced amounts, etc.). This 
situation is not improved by introducing another 
denomination, currency or other piece of paper, as this fails 
to address the lack of confidence forming the core of the 
problem. Two private sector actors will not have increased 
confidence in the other’s creditworthiness by denominating 
their claims against one another in Cape Verde escudo or 
another new “local money” invented by them rather than 
in forints.
Another wrong conclusion is to attribute a detrimental 
effect to the interest bearing nature of monetary 
instruments, as the most common currency now in 
circulation bears no interest either, and, on the other hand, 
without interest on account money, or rather the deposit 
generated from such account money and credits, there 
would be no financial mediation. It would be naive to 
believe that any prohibition on the imposition or elimination 
of interest would generate an upsurge in consumption on 
the system level that could materially boost the economy. 
On the contrary, the imposition of a prohibition on the 
collection of interest would render financial mediation 
impossible, which means that efficiency in the utilisation of 
economic resources would fall to levels characteristic of 
barter-based economies. (The inefficiency of the latter 
need not be described in detail here.) The general level of 
interest, however, does affect economic activity, as modern 
monetary policy measures are based on this very fact. One 
may therefore argue for the necessity to have high or low 
policy rates in place according to various economic theories; 
however, allegations about the detrimental effect of 
interest or yield as such for the purposes of monetary flows 
reveals a basic misconception about the operation of 
financial mediation. Criticism of modern financial 
intermediary systems with the above arguments is targeted 
many times at national banks themselves. In the modern 
system, national banks provide the base funds constituting 
denomination of the particular currency. The underlying 
claims on the base money are made against its value 
appraisal function and its common denomination role, 
rather than the quantity of money, which is usually 
significantly lower than the size of the entire financial 
intermediation system. Claims on the national banks acting 
as base money providers serve as an expression and 
denomination of credit claims between private economy 
actors, including sight balance of bank accounts held with 
commercial banks. In other words, a particular debtor in 
the private economy, in the case of account money held 
with a commercial bank, makes a promise to repay the debt 
in central bank money at its maturity (in the case of sight 
claims, at any time at the request of the claim holder). In 
modern economies, monetary flow in banknotes and coins 
(the modern form of cash) is much less significant than 
money transactions effected on commercial bank accounts. 
Accordingly, financial transactions in a modern economy 
are effected by way of transfers (that is, “private money”) 
between e-accounts to a much larger extent, using no 
banknotes or coins at all.
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of various types of 
monies and cash substitutes.
GeNeRAl CHARACteRiStiCS OF 
“lOCAl MONey” SySteMS
theoretical foundations of “local 
money” initiatives
As demonstrated above, one of the key characteristics of 
monetary systems serving modern market economies is that 
financial instruments and therefore “money” itself used in 
payment transactions materialise primarily in claims 
between private market actors. In the majority of countries, 
1   The essence of monetary systems based on credit lies in private economy actors’ credit claims rather than a commodity standard (e.g. gold coins) 
performing monetary functions. While allowing the sensible creation of aggregates in commodity standard systems on the “quantity of money”, no money 
quantity index compiled by statistical methods in monetary systems based on credit is capable of demonstrating the system’s flexibility in settlement of 
and effecting transactions. Monetary aggregates (e.g. M1, M2, etc.) as an aggregate of balance sheets of commercial banks and the central bank in a 
modern economy as statistical indices may serve to demonstrate economic activity at the most, but are unsuitable for acting as permanent and solid 
direct variables for making decisions about the quantity of money. This applies all the more so as the grand totals for these aggregates − as indicated 
above − are determined by private market processes (e.g. decisions of households concerning their investment portfolio) and not directly by economic 
policy. For more details on the theoretical and practical limits of money quantity indices currently in use, see Komáromi (2008).MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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state-controlled central banks are vested with the powers 
to issue banknotes in paper form. At the same time, for the 
purposes of the actual operation of economies it is of less 
significance which entity is actually vested with such 
powers, in contrast to the actual operation of the particular 
monetary system (which and how market actors generate 
account money in an economy). Cash substitutes are issued 
by credit institutions under prudential state control 
practically in each case. However, there are initiatives in a 
number of countries all over the world which are regarded 
as  “local monies”, “private money” or “supplementary 
money" and have broken ties with traditional financial 
intermediation. In these cases it is by no means a surprising 
development to see them as private initiatives, as credit 
institutions are themselves owned by private individuals 
and anyone with sufficient funds may establish credit 
institutions with the right to set its operational rules within 
legislative bounds.
The single novel element in these initiatives is linking their 
operations to the attainment of specific objectives, by 
establishing a “club” or community for the trade vouchers 
and promissory notes issued by them. These include, for 
example, promoting purchases from a merchant in some 
limited geographic area, or promoting the purchase of 
green products (that is, products manufactured without 
damage to the environment), or promoting purchase of 
special products or services (e.g. catering). The formation 
of purchasers' clubs or community collaboration is not novel 
in itself. Looking back through Hungarian history, it emerges 
that the Védegylet (Defence Association), under the 
auspices of Lajos Kossuth, was also a community with 
voluntary commitment to attain its objectives. The 
particular financial schemes contain no novelty or new 
element from a financial perspective, as they involves 
issuance of a trade voucher generally constituting a credit 
claim on a non-state actor, in paper form or in a form 
recorded solely in account registries. This constitutes the 
very foundations of the traditional monetary system (where 
the payment transactions materialise in the exchange of 
monetary claims on private actors) which these “local 
monies” wish to replace. The majority of such initiatives 
are compelled to rely on the denomination provided by the 
central bank of the particular country, all the while giving 
grandiose names to these trade vouchers, unit certificates 
and other financial liabilities (e.g. “local money”). The 
claims should be denominated in some existing currency, 
therefore the rate of exchange of a particular claim 
materialised in a single unit of the local money against a 
legal tender used for value appraisal in a much larger scope 
of acceptance should be duly explicitly listed and advertised.
Put in another way, the question as to what conditions 
should be in place under which “local monies” could prove 
table 1
Key features of monies and cash substitutes in Hungary
Form of money
Monies Cash substitutes
legal tenders Commercial bank money trade vouchers “local monies”
Issuer
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
(the central bank of 
Hungary)
Commercial banks and 
credit institutions
Companies
Local communities and 
cooperatives
Form Banknotes and coins




Known and used in the 
widest spectrum of 
users, everyone shall 
accept them at face 
value within the country
Used outside the 
particular bank, prompt 
transfers outside the 
bank or acceptance of 
cash withdrawals at face 
value are guaranteed
Companies and 
merchants accepting such 
vouchers under separate 
agreement between 
them
Members of the 
community only, with 
redemption subject to 
commission only
Transferability to other 
currencies and vice versa
Transferable to any other 
currency or financial 
instruments easily 
without being subject to 
payment of commission
Prompt transfers outside 
the bank and cash 





are appropriate bank 
liquidity management 
and, as a last resort, 
deposit protection)
Redemption or 
transferability to other 
currencies or financial 
instruments are generally 
not possible
Redemption to real 
money is subject to 
limitations or fees 
(generally in the form of 
a commission)
Quantity (total quantity 
issued as at the end of 
2010)
HUF 2,464 billion HUF 4,417 billion
HUF 150-200 billion
(MNB estimate)
Approx. HUF 10 million
(as revealed in the press)MNB BulletiN • April 2011 33
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successful in economic terms will lead us to emergency 
monies. 
The precious metal commodity standards in place up to the 
seventies were detrimental in the sense that central banks 
were limited in their powers to issue money to the extent 
of their precious metal reserves, and precious metals 
constituting the basis for money issue were themselves 
products, with a separate price and demand for them. This 
is the case even today, with precious metals having their 
own markets. In the past, however, the very value of money 
depended on the then current market price of these 
precious metals. For example, in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire market disturbances arose from a significant upturn 
in silver production − and, with the then currency of forint 
having a silver basis − it brought about the inflation of the 
forint after relative inflation of the currency due to the 
more pronounced supply of the metal (Sós, 1921).
As could happen typically during times of war, the prices of 
products and services would fluctuate considerably, 
resulting very easily in a shortage of cash, which could in 
effect paralyse the economy. The major reason giving rise 
to so-called emergency money lies in the difficulty of 
directly exchanging products with other ones in societies 
having surpassed primitive community systems (partly due 
to diverging needs, partly due to the impossibility of 
dividing particular products into smaller parts). Such 
emergency monies have been issued mostly by towns or 
regions of limited size. The 1848−49 Hungarian War of 
Independence saw a number of such examples, when the 
emperor’s money then in circulation could no longer be 
exchanged for precious metals for obvious reasons.
As reported by the Magistrate, we should take some measures 
for want of monies in small denominations, as this morning 
as many as three men from the lower part of the town 
appeared before him to urge us to do something, as they are 
unable to buy salt, fat or meat unless they buy in exchange 
for a full 15-Kreutzer banknote. Although they have money, 
and despite this fact, they can buy even salt under extreme 
difficulties only. To calm down the discontented people, the 
towns of Újhely and Patak already issued and distributed 
banknotes of small denominations. ... It would be very 
suitable and expedient for us too to arrange for issuing such 
banknotes of small denominations and to restore order 
among the town people. We have decreed to send the 
Magistrate and the Senior Town Clerk to Patak with authority 
to arrange for the printing of banknotes in the maximum 
amount of 300 Pengő forints (Hőgye, 1999).
Similar solutions emerged abroad between the two world 
wars, especially during the Great Depression. Supporters of 
“local monies” prefer to cite the example of the village of 
Wörgl with 4300 inhabitants, where the mayor issued 
“stamp money” in July 1932, which − when left unstamped 
− lost 1% of its value each month and 2% on redemption 
(thereby rendering redemption uneconomical). It was 
accepted by the local government for the payment of local 
taxes. The issue was backed by the theory of the economist 
Silvio Gesell (1862−1930). Town employees (including the 
mayor) received half their salaries in stamp money, while 
casual workers received their remuneration in full in stamp 
money. The issue proved a success, the rate of unemployment 
fell, which however may instead be attributable to the 
public project construction works organised then by the 
local government (construction of apartments, a new 
bridge, water reservoir for the fire department and ski-
jumping ramp) (Fisher, 1933).
Emergency monies contributed to solving local shortage of 
cash and economic circulation was restored. In this sense, 
it was an effective solution under the then current 
conditions of monetary system and war. Nowadays, however, 
central banks have all the means at their disposal to provide 
adequate cash to the economy, thus since the seventies 
“local monies” cannot be regarded as operating as 
supplementary money, even on a theoretical level.
international examples of “local 
money” initiatives and the types 
thereof
the German regional trade voucher (or “money”) 
initiatives
Such initiatives have also emerged in a number of regions 
and towns in Germany (“Regiogeld”), with the declared 
objective of boosting local economic activity, more precisely 
of boosting the turnover of local merchants (naturally, to 
the detriment of turnover that could be generated by 
merchants located or deemed to be located outside the 
particular town). The initiatives usually list in their 
membership as places of acceptance low-turnover merchants 
and shops which are affected by the adverse effects of 
globalism, as represented by the competition imposed by 
large food store chains and hypermarkets. The value of the 
trade vouchers is linked to the euro; 1 trade voucher unit is 
usually worth 1 euro. A number of initiatives are 
characterised by periodic (e.g. monthly) devaluation of the 
purchasing value (“Schwundgeld”) of the trade vouchers in 
circulation by a certain percentage to ensure higher 
turnover for the members and rapid utilisation of the 
vouchers by the holders. The issuers usually include 
cooperatives founded by local enterprises and merchants 
particularly for this purpose, or to promote the fulfilment MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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of other current objectives of theirs. Although the number 
of such initiatives in Germany is relatively high (the 2006 
report of the Bundesbank lists 16 already existing and a 
number of prospective initiatives in this field in Germany), 
the volume of issued trade vouchers has failed to reach 
noticeable proportions even on a regional level. In 2006 the 
German central bank estimated the aggregate value of 
trade vouchers issued under these initiatives at EUR 
200,000 (with the majority of these initiatives having been 
in existence for 3-4 years by then). According to sporadic 
data, in 2010 the aggregate volume may have surpassed 
that amount. The largest German issuer had managed to 
put “local money” into circulation in an amount 
corresponding to approx. EUR 460,000 (approx. HUF   
126 million) by 2010.
the Swiss WiR Bank
The active promoters and supporters of “local money” 
initiatives often cite the Swiss WIR Bank founded in 1934 (as 
a cooperative). Today, WIR Bank operates as a credit 
institution and according to the Swiss central bank, it ranks 
among the smaller-sized credit institutions in Switzerland. 
The bank also engages in traditional banking operations 
(that is, denominated in Swiss francs), which, according to 
its annual report for 2009, significantly surpasses its 
operations linked to the “alternative” money it has created.
Its banking operations in alternative money are intended to 
promote trade between Swiss small and medium-sized 
enterprises, that is, its operations are not limited to a small 
geographical area. The trade voucher issued by the bank is 
called WIR (also with separate currency code: CHW) and 
exists in electronic registrations only, with no hard copy 
vouchers issued. An interesting feature of the trade 
voucher, in contrast to the German Regiogeld initiatives, is 
that this bank will not redeem the vouchers to Swiss francs, 
and expressly prohibits any redemption by its clientele. WIR 
money does not bear interest to ensure rapid circulation 
(the bank will neither pay interest on WIR denominated 
amounts nor may any WIR amount be tied up in term 
deposits, and no WIR exists outside the bank due to the 
system characteristics). An interesting feature is that the 
Bank also extends credits in WIR, with interest generally 
lower than credits extended in Swiss francs, but no material 
deviation exists as to the coverage required for credits in 
the two currencies: credits denominated in WIR must also 
have appropriate coverage (property or other assets). 
Merchants willing to accept WIR as a form of payment 
generally define in advance the percentage of invoiced 
amounts that may be settled in WIR. Membership of the 
system comprises 66,000 Swiss small and medium-sized 
enterprises, a considerable number, corresponding to 
approx. 20% of Swiss SMEs. Strikingly, the balance sheet of 
WIR Bank reveals that the aggregate WIR portfolio amounts 
to WIR 800 million (that is CHF 800 million, as the 
theoretical exchange rate is 1:1, though it is a theoretical 
rate, because no conversion takes place in practice). This 
amount is insignificant compared to the magnitude of the 
Swiss economy, the SME sector or the traditional financial 
intermediation system in Switzerland. (The same applies to 
the annual turnover denominated in WIR in the approx. 
amount of WIR 1-2 billion). The extent of existing WIR units 
in the balance sheet of the WIR Bank itself represents a 
small proportion compared to its much larger CHF-
denominated receivables (the balance sheet grand total of 
the bank amounts to approx. CHF 3.2 billion). According to 
press reports, prohibition of WIR-CHF conversion has given 
rise to a “WIR black market”, where enterprises or persons 
wishing to exchange their WIR balance will sustain 
considerable losses (receiving approx. 60-80% of the WIR 
balance in CHF) (Graumarkt bedroht das WIR-System, 2003).
In addition to the foregoing, it is remarkable that the 
initiative has been in operation for more than 75 years and 
despite the number of crises in its history it has received 
considerable international acclaim among supporters of 
similar local or supplementary monies.
local exchange trading systems (letS)
Local exchange trading systems have been in existence 
since the beginning of the 1980s. They first appeared in 
Anglo-Saxon countries and have now spread to a number of 
countries. The purpose of LETS-type systems is very similar 
to those of “local money” initiatives. The underlying idea 
of organisers is that the traditional financial system is 
ineffective and is unsuitable for adequately supporting local 
economies. For this reason, local exchange trading systems 
introduce settlement units, where the value of services 
provided by system members to one another (baby-sitting, 
language courses, minor repairs, etc.) − less frequently the 
value of merchandise − is credited. The value of such a 
settlement unit generally corresponds to the national legal 
tender, to ensure ease of comparison of values. These 
systems differ from the mainstream financial system in that 
no central issuer is in place, but service users acknowledge 
the value of the service utilised by them; therefore, a 
positive account entry constitutes a liability on the part of 
the entire community (mutual credit). It also means that 
the aggregate amount of all account balances in a LETS 
system is always 0 (those having utilised more or higher 
value services from the community than they provided to 
the community have a negative account balance). The 
system − employing no hard copy vouchers − operates a 
central registry (accounts), which has developed into an MNB BulletiN • April 2011 35
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electronic system in each case by now. The system is 
thoroughly transparent, information on all balances held by 
members is available to all members. In the system, no 
interest accrues and there is a balance limit, to both the 
negative and the positive, beyond which no further increase 
in the balance is allowed. All over the world, hundreds of 
LETS systems are currently up and running. LETS supporters 
claim these systems may contribute to the development of 
the local economy, especially to the reduction of 
unemployment. Criticism of LETS usually highlights the 
instability in these systems, as they are susceptible to 
discontinuance due to fading interest or loss of trust in the 
system.
time banking
Time banking in essence is a subcategory of LETS, where 
members provide one another with services as described 
above in connection with LETS. In time banking, the unit of 
settlement is labour time, assets and liabilities are recorded 
in work hours. The scheme is most common in the US, with 
the largest one having approx. 1,000 members.
Currency voucher systems
A number of currency voucher initiatives that may be 
deemed local money in actual printout form similarly to the 
German Regiogeld can be found all over the world. A 
common feature in each system is a central issuer, with 
identical denomination to the national legal tender, and in 
general (but not always) an offer of discount to those 
making purchases with these vouchers, most of the time by 
providing a voucher with a face value some percent higher 
than the face value of the real money paid for them. This 
discount is then paid off by the merchants who accept such 
vouchers, as they will receive on redemption an amount in 
real money some percent lower than the face value of such 
vouchers. As regards their form, these systems in essence 
do not deviate from a purchasers’ club or a set of coupons 
granting discounts for purchases issued in a local newspaper. 
The only difference between the two lies in the reusability 
of the voucher by the accepting merchant; therefore, they 
are not compelled to redeem it for cash. An example of 
such a system is the Toronto Dollar, where the issuer’s 
profit is put out for tender open for social organisations 
(e.g. engaged in children’s catering or care of the homeless).
Systema de trueke
Systema de Trueke is a South American local barter market 
based on Indian traditions, where barter is promoted with 
the involvement of its own money. In barter transactions, 
agricultural produce and locally available services are 
typically exchanged.
liberty Dollar
Liberty Dollar was a private money issued in the United 
States with silver and gold coin backing. As the authorities 
− and later also the courts − held the view that the issuer 
had committed a criminal act, they sentenced the issuer to 
imprisonment and seized the precious metal backing. 
Characteristics of “local monies”  
and “local money” initiatives in trade 
voucher form
As the issue of banknotes and coins is a government 
monopoly and “local monies” exist most of the time in the 
form of trade vouchers, here we embark on the description 
of the general economic reasons underlying such trade 
vouchers, the most important concepts and the legal status 
of these systems.
In the course of exchanging commodities, payment and 
delivery of the commodity may take place at times apart, 
one of the most popular solutions to this end being trade 
vouchers, which are particularly useful for private 
consumers in arranging for gifts (e.g. books or clothes) and 
are also available to companies (e.g. fuel vouchers for truck 
drivers). A common characteristic of all trade vouchers is 
that the company wishing to sell merchandise or provide 
services receives payment for the trade voucher in advance, 
and the payer having provided the advance (or another 
person to whom the trade voucher is passed) may redeem 
it for merchandise or services available from the company.
In this sense trade vouchers represent an advance payment 
and a promissory note on the part of the company engaged 
in sales or service provision to deliver the merchandise in the 
quantity corresponding to the value of the advance. The 
voucher is a monetary asset in the sense that the holder in 
essence provides commercial credit to the issuer, which may 
as well spend the real money received for the voucher in the 
meantime. The trade voucher − following from its commercial 
credit characteristics − carries credit risk. This means that 
bankruptcy or insolvency of the trade voucher issuer before 
delivery of the merchandise or provision of the service will 
render the trade voucher worthless, and the current holder 
will lose the amount paid for the voucher. However, this risk 
is not apparent in everyday life, as only a tiny fraction of 
total turnover is effected through trade vouchers and this 
rate does not represent a significant amount in the budget of 
those concerned either.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Over the past decade, another form of trade vouchers has 
become widely used in Hungary, with more participants 
than in the above scheme (Chart 2).
This scheme is principally based on the tax allowance 
provided by the state on the use of such vouchers. The 
issuer puts into circulation trade vouchers for particular 
services and the state provides incentives for payments 
for these purposes by imposing lower tax rates. The 
scheme is special in the sense that the issuer provides no 
merchandise or service to the consumers at all, but enters 
into contract with companies capable of doing so in its 
stead. It will, however, result in a situation that differs 
from the underlying situation behind traditional trade 
vouchers, as the original transaction may not be deemed 
as a commercial credit. The issuer in essence acts as a 
financial agent for the accepting companies, but at the 
time of the voucher issue it will not know for whom it will 
operate as a financial agent. The credit risk will, however, 
be present on the part of the holder vis-à-vis the issuer of 
the cafeteria voucher.
tHe MARKetS FOR tRADe vOuCHeRS 
AND lOCAl MONieS iN HuNGARy
Cafeteria vouchers
On account of the tax allowance provided by the state, 
cafeteria vouchers came into general use in Hungary within 
a very short period of time. The tax allowance is granted 
primarily to promote social policy objectives and may also 
contribute to the “whitening” of the economy to some 
extent (as the redemption of the voucher to legal tender is 
recorded). Assessment of the system as to whether it 
promotes the targeted social policy objectives is beyond 
the scope of responsibility of the MNB. One issue, however, 
is obvious, namely that the scheme is very costly − despite 
its aim of reducing administration costs. (For example, a 
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local transport pass could be financed for an employee by 
the employer, if the employer presents the relevant invoice, 
and it would not be a significant administrative burden to 
record an invoice for an annual pass; but − for example − 
administrating catering costs on a daily basis would 
definitely constitute an administrative burden. To our 
knowledge, issuers charge 5-6% of the voucher’s face value 
to employers and deduct 4-5% from acceptors when 
redeeming the voucher). In addition, the issuer generates 
revenues from interest accruing on the advance between 
the date of issue and redemption, as well as from outdated, 
lost or simply unused and unredeemed vouchers. On the 
other hand, issuers may incur considerable costs in the 
production of the vouchers, the related administration and 
from any forged vouchers or frauds.
Although no official data collection takes place in this 
matter, the market size is said to be in the range of HUF 
100-500 billion. The largest segment in the total volume of 
traded vouchers is that of hot-meal vouchers.
The market structure is characterised by:
•   High concentration, with approx. 70% of the total turnover 
being generated by three large foreign-owned issuers;
•   the state itself playing a significant role in the market 
with its recreation voucher scheme;
•   A large number of low-turnover schemes in an electronic 
form, at times supplemented with bank card function.
“local money” vouchers
Although there is a lot being said about plans to issue local 
money vouchers, the only scheme that operates in practice 
is the voucher named “kékfrank” (blue franc) issued by the 
Ha-Mi-Összefogunk Európai Szövetkezet (If We Stand United 
European Cooperative) of the city of Sopron. One blue franc 
equals one forint, but a commission of 2%+VAT is deducted 
from the client wishing to redeem the blue franc to 
Hungarian forint. The consideration for the vouchers is 
deposited by the Ha-Mi Szövetkezet at the Rajka és Vidéke 
Takarékszövetkezet (Rajka and Vicinity Savings Cooperative) 
as a term deposit. The National Bank has information at its 
disposal about the quantity of the issued vouchers; however, 
as it is unique information it may not be disclosed.2 
The issuer is a cooperative as regards its legal form and no 
person other than the members of the cooperative may 
purchase and redeem the voucher at the savings cooperative 
managing the deposit. Anyone requesting blue franc at the 
savings cooperative will first be checked for membership in 
the Ha-Mi Cooperative. When a person is granted 
membership, Ha-Mi provides an updated list of members to 
the savings cooperative. Pursuant to the regulations of 
Ha-Mi Cooperative, membership is granted under a 
resolution of the board of directors only, and board 
meetings are held every 2-3 months. This represents a 
strong barrier to those wishing to request blue franc, as it 
prevents access to the voucher on the part of prospective 
holders following an instantaneous decision. On exiting the 
scheme, Ha-Mi is responsible for notifying the savings 
cooperative and at such times Ha-Mi will collect the 
vouchers from the exiting member. The members of the 
cooperative are primarily from the city of Sopron and its 
vicinity, and its website suggests that the range of 
companies accepting the vouchers includes companies in 
Székesfehérvár, Budapest and Austria. Some of these 
companies provide a discount of 5-15% to the customer on 
the use of blue franc.
eCONOMiC iSSueS CONCeRNiNG 
“lOCAl MONieS”
Promoters of local monies often claim that they have 
beneficial effects on the local economy. Below we will 
examine in detail the major aspects that should be taken 
into account when assessing the impact of “local money” 
vouchers on the local economy.
i. Misconception about the circulation of money in 
geographical terms
One of the advantages that “local monies” are often 
claimed to have is their role in promoting purchases by local 
people and enterprises in local shops and not elsewhere, 
thereby making the economy of the particular town or 
region prosper. This argument is wrong for two reasons.
One of the reasons is obvious: local people and companies 
use services available in their place of residence or registered 
seat and their immediate vicinity even without using “local 
money”. It is probably not wrong to assume that, for 
example, the majority of residents of Nyíregyháza will buy 
their bread in bakeries or shops located in Nyíregyháza, buy 
gasoline at local filling stations, have their hair cut by local 
hairdressers, and will typically not travel to other towns to 
obtain these goods and services. The MNB study entitled “A 
magyarországi pénzforgalom térképe” (Map of money 
transactions in Hungary) (Helmeczi, 2010) has revealed that 
approx. 40% of credit transfers are addressed to recipients 
2 On entry into the market of another voucher, the National Bank will naturally have the right to disclose national aggregate data.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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located within the same city, and approx. 50% to recipients 
within 50 km of the particular city.
Chart 3 covers credit transfers only (a typical method of 
payment between companies), excluding payments in cash. 
For this reason, we can only have estimates about the total 
volume of money transactions; we hold the view that the 
amounts above 40% represent the lowest extent, because 
private individuals generally pay in local shops in cash 
rather than by bank transfer. This is supported by the 
research (Brockmann, 2006) which relies on the findings of 
a banknote tracking website in the USA.3 The research4 
revealed that the overwhelming majority of banknotes (50-
70%) will not travel more than 10 km from the most recent 
place of detection within two weeks.
It thus follows that “local money” initiatives are addressing 
a problem already solved when they cite consumption on a 
local level. As data suggest that private individuals and 
companies alike primarily spend their money locally, such 
initiatives alone will not boost the revenues of shops and 
service providers.
The second − seemingly contradictory − reason is that by 
now the division of labour and specialisation in the economy 
have become very intensive, much more than they were a 
hundred years ago, and no country − even those that are 
bigger than Hungary, even continent-sized countries − can 
meet each and every need that may arise in them, let alone 
in particular towns. This means that local shops obtain the 
majority of merchandise from other towns or countries. 
That is, private individuals − although paying the local 
merchant for the merchandise − in essence “transfer” this 
amount to a producer located in another town or country 
through this merchant.
In the example of Nyíregyháza, local people obtain the 
majority of electricity, natural gas, gasoline, passenger 
cars, TV sets, (cell) phone services, coffee sold in a 
cafeteria or in general the majority of food from other 
towns and cities in Hungary or other countries through the 
local commercial outlets. Therefore, it does not matter if a 
local enterprise or household pays in “local money”, they 
will support those producers; meanwhile, locals can export5 
kitchen appliances and children’s toys to other parts of the 
country and/or the world, which may also be paid for in the 
“local money”. 
It follows from the foregoing that the real option for those 
committed to the furtherance of their immediate area is 
limited to buying local products when available. This 
objective, however, cannot be achieved by using “local 
money” vouchers, as such would require a conscious 
decision on the part of consumers, which is much more 
influenced by the price of products.
ii. inadequacy of the amount of cash in circulation
Promoters of “local monies” furthermore argue that the 
amount of means of exchange (HUF) is less than required to 
be adequate, and the shortage of 4-5% will hinder or 
obstruct the proper operation of the economy in Hungary 
(Perkovátz, 2010).
As shown above, there indeed have been times when this 
statement was true for a certain period of time; in history 
such situations emerged only in the period of precious 
metal standard systems and within that only in times of 
war.
The problem referenced by the issuers of the voucher no 
longer exists, as the gold and silver standards ceased to 
exist some 30-40 years ago. The problem that may have 
emerged in times of war centuries ago can no longer do so, 
due to the monetary system operating on different 
principles. The amount of cash in circulation is not 
3   On the website http://www.wheresgeorge.com people can voluntarily enter the particulars of banknotes in their possession by means their serial 
numbers and can check the former route of a banknote up to the time it reached them.
4   The original purpose of the research was to reveal the underlying patterns behind the movement of humans, primarily in the fight against epidemics. 
The authors used the data base on the said website complied by volunteers in the context of the said project.
5 Nyíregyháza accommodates an Electrolux and a LEGO factory.
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determined by the central banks but by market actors 
(including households) by the amount of cash they wish to 
withdraw. Accordingly, the amount of cash in circulation 
fluctuates on a seasonal level, e.g. it traditionally rises 
before Christmas and falls in January.
The more moderate lending activity of commercial banks as 
compared to pre-crisis levels is likewise not attributable to 
the “shortage of money” (that is, it is not as if banks were 
unable to extend credits) but to much more stringent credit 
appraisals by banks, and companies themselves strive to 
use less leverage than before.
iii. Potential impact of “local monies” intended to 
promote consumption
“Local money” vouchers called “Schwundgeld” exist in a 
version widely used in German territories in particular. 
Their special characteristics lie in the monthly reduction in 
value when taken out of circulation, thereby motivating 
their holder to use them for purchases. Such a scheme 
could in principle promote the short-term growth of the 
local economy, although the theoretical father of the 
scheme established the system for another reason, to 
render accumulation of capital impossible, as such a 
voucher does not have the accumulating/hoarding attribute 
of money.6
As in Germany a very large number of Schwungeld-type 
“local money” initiatives were launched, the German 
central bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank, prepared a study 
on the issue in 2006 (Rösl, 2006). The study gives an outline 
of the schemes then in place and in the pipeline, provides 
a criticism of the theory of Silvio Gesell and gives a 
calculation of the welfare loss sustained by a society were 
the whole of Germany to shift to the exclusive use of 
Schwungeld. According to the study, this loss would amount 
to approx. EUR 1,600/inhabitant/year.
“Local monies” are in use even in Germany at an insignificant 
level (despite the numerous schemes, the aggregate value 
of vouchers issued in Germany was merely EUR 200,000 in 
2006, approx. HUF 55 million; in other words, every 
2,650,000th banknote denominated in EUR had 1 unit of a 
“local money” counterpart), so the Bundesbank came to 
the conclusion that these initiatives have no effect on the 
German economy.
iv. Costs of the various payment methods
Payment itself incurs costs and the costs of the various 
methods may vary considerably, which means that running 
payment methods involving low turnover may prove 
economically unsound. Last year the MNB prepared a 
detailed analysis on the social costs of payment methods 
(Divéki et al., 2010b). The findings reveal that the majority 
of payment methods have high fixed costs, and because of 
this fact they can only be cost-effective if a high volume of 
transactions are effected. In the MNB survey there seems to 
be an obvious correlation between the size of the acceptor 
base and the unit transaction costs of the particular 
payment method.
Although cafeteria vouchers were not included in the 
study, publicly available information (e.g. general terms 
of business) suggest that the situation is the same, 
namely that the scheme is run at very high unit 
transaction costs.
In its study on innovative payment methods (Divéki et al., 
2010a), the MNB demonstrated that every new payment 
method faces “the chicken or the egg” causality dilemma, 
namely that as long as there are not enough acceptors, no 
one will want to use the new solution (e.g. touch-free 
payment by bank card). In other words, it is extremely 
difficult to recruit acceptors until the solution is used by a 
massive number of users. On the part of prospective 
acceptors, the underlying thought is that the solution would 
generate losses for them until the acceptors’ base reaches 
an appropriate size.
“Local monies” probably face a situation that is similar to 
the situation of cafeteria vouchers, namely production, 
protection against forgery and handling of vouchers 
materially reduces the amount available for spending on 
local products, in other words, its aggregate welfare effect 
is negative as compared to payment in cash or by electronic 
means. Although “local money” vouchers differ from 
cafeteria vouchers in that the former may be re-used7 
(which questions whether they may be called vouchers), the 
transaction costs are probably significant. In addition, they 
will remain a much more expensive method of payment 
than rival modes of payment in the long run, unless the 
number of units issued and the acceptor network are 
expanded at a very strong pace.
6   Economists have diverging opinions on this issue: some claim that even if something is capable of fulfilling a function at a very low efficiency, it 
nevertheless does fulfil such function in a formal sense.
7 The MNB has anecdotal information at its disposal suggesting that enterprises use hot meal vouchers among others as a method of payment.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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v. intra-town monies vs. supranational currencies
Technological development (transportation) brought a 
division of labour among countries in different continents. 
It rendered difficulties of conversion between national 
currencies a barrier in commercial relations, which made 
countries with a similar level of development within the 
same region think about the establishment of a monetary 
union. The majority of people in Hungary probably know 
only the euro zone, but the fact is that by now almost all 
continents have seen their own mutual monetary systems 
created (even in Africa), where individual countries 
surrender their currencies in exchange for economic 
advantages.8 A number of expert studies have underscored 
the beneficial impact of a larger internal economy for 
economic development and, as forecast by the MNB, the 
introduction of the euro will be followed by a growth of 
GDP in Hungary (Csajbók and Csermely, 2002). One should 
seek an answer to the question: what would happen in a 
country belonging to the European Union with individual 
local monies in and around each city rather than the entire 
union using the same money. This question may have 
already emerged for the pioneers of the “local money” 
movement in Hungary, which is seen for example in their 
plans for developing schemes now in the pipeline in a way 
that they will be accepted in the area of acceptance 
belonging to another local money and vice versa.
RiSKS ASSOCiAteD WitH vOuCHeRS 
AND “lOCAl MONieS”
i. Business (regulatory) risks
“Trade vouchers” are neither defined nor regulated in 
Hungarian legislation. Although some laws do mention trade 
vouchers (e.g. the Act on Credit Institutions and Financial 
Enterprises,9 the Labour Code and tax laws), lacking any 
legal definition, a trade voucher is be deemed as such when 
the issuer claims it as one. This also means that authorities 
are not in a position to unambiguously determine whether 
a particular scheme indeed involves a trade voucher, and as 
such whether or not it constitutes an exception to the 
definition laid down in the Act on Credit Institutions and 
Financial Enterprises on non-cash means of payment.
This deficiency in regulations would not pose any problems 
in the case of traditional trade vouchers, as in this case the 
principal activity involves the sale of fuel, books or clothes 
and not the issuance of trade vouchers.
Currently, however, there are schemes in widespread 
application that go far beyond the simple commercial credit 
feature trade vouchers have. The issuers of such trade 
vouchers manage other people’s money outside the control 
of any and all supervisory authorities and under no 
limitations as to their operations.
As no statutory legislation is in place regarding trade 
vouchers, the general terms of business of the issuer is the 
sole set of regulations to govern the use of the trade 
vouchers. Without aiming to be all-inclusive, the following 
rules are missing:
•   rules on restricting change to the extent of redemption 
commission, deadline for acceptance (etc.) when the 
trade voucher is redeemed for legal tender;
•   rules on informing customers about these changes;
•   rules  on  changing  the  marketability  of  trade  vouchers 
among members and on changing the deadline of 
redemption by issuer;10
•   prohibition on issuing unsecured trade vouchers (for the 
time being, this obligation is assumed on a voluntary basis 
and nothing prevents unsecured trade vouchers from 
being issued);
•   rules on security management (e.g. security kept on a 
custody account or in government bonds, etc.), protection 
of security in the case of bankruptcy of issuer;
•   rules on limiting the scope of operations of the company 
engaged in trade voucher issue (as any loss in other activities 
may reduce the security underlying the vouchers to zero);
•   the  distribution  of  profits  from  the  security  and/or 
commissions may give rise to revenue transfer among the 
members.
These rules not being in place, the issuer of the trade 
voucher may abuse its discretion to the detriment of its 
clients.
ii. Credit risk
As trade vouchers represent a credit, these schemes involve 
credit risk. Acceptors of the credit face two kinds of credit 
risk:
8   The countries retain their powers over the issue of money. The European Central Bank, for example, is owned by national central banks − including 
the Magyar Nemzeti Bank − and the decision-making board consists of members acting as chairmen of the central banks.
9 Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises
10 This may be necessary when there is a wave of forgeries, which also applies in the case of banknotes.MNB BulletiN • April 2011 41
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•   risk associated with the issuer of the trade voucher: the 
risk involving the bankruptcy of the issuer, or of the issuer 
issuing unsecured vouchers and the holders of trade 
vouchers not being able to recover a significant part of 
the money spent on the vouchers;
•   the risk associated with the credit institution where the 
security of vouchers is kept: the risk materialises in the 
bankruptcy of the credit institution managing the 
underlying security.
In the first case, the amount of money recovered will 
depend on the range of people having obtained the 
particular type of trade voucher. In the legal form applied 
in these schemes in Hungary, where the trade vouchers may 
be circulated among the members (or, in other words, 
owners) of the cooperative, the holders will have access to 
the assets to be distributed among themselves that are left 
unpaid after the satisfaction of all other creditors.
In the second case, deposit protection in principle would 
provide compensation for part of the losses, but protection 
− under deposit protection − will only apply to amounts 
under EUR 100,000. When the issue of a “local money” 
voucher exceeds EUR 100,000,11 any amount in excess would 
be lost by the users of the trade voucher in the case of a 
bankruptcy.
iii. Risk of forgery
Despite the fact that some of the “local money” vouchers 
are manufactured in the Hungarian Banknote Printing 
Company, which also produces banknotes, the technology 
and security features used in the production of “local 
money” vouchers represent a much lower standard than 
those applied for legal tender.
As these are much more easily forged than HUF banknotes 
forgers could decide to forge these trade vouchers rather 
than the legal tender if they can get the same benefits and 
goods through them. In addition, they will face much less 
severe legal sanctions as forgery of trade vouchers is not 
deemed forgery of banknotes, which comes under severe 
legal sanctions.
We anticipate a pronounced increase in the risk of forgery 
to be borne by those wishing to redeem the trade vouchers 
to forint once the issue of “local money” vouchers exceeds 
a certain limit and they become widely used by the 
population.
iv. Risk of misleading consumers
Further risks are associated with different presentations 
of trade vouchers and their characteristics by the issuer to 
the authorities and to the general public. Both in the 
general terms of business and to the authorities, it is 
claimed that what is involved is a local trade voucher and 
not money, while to the general public and to companies 
it is clearly positioned as money. This is suggested by the 
following:
•   the fancy names given to the trade vouchers, including 
former Hungarian and foreign monies: franc, thaler, 
crown;
•   resemblance to banknotes;12
•   the  rationale  on  the  use  of  such  trade  vouchers 
(“inadequate supply of cash in economy”) and the term 
“local money” itself.
These factors may create a false sense of security in 
consumers, as they may assume that “local money” is also 
backed by the state, yet they have to bear the risks 
associated with the issuer.
RiSKS ASSOCiAteD WitH CAFeteRiA 
vOuCHeRS
Issuers describe "local monies” as trade vouchers, therefore 
we deem it reasonable to examine whether the risks 
described above also pertain to cafeteria vouchers with 
their much more pronounced economic significance.
i. Business/regulatory risks
Trade vouchers are not regulated under current legislation 
and this also applies to cafeteria vouchers. In contrast to 
“local money” vouchers, however, cafeteria vouchers:
•   are for amounts denominated in HuF;
•   have expiry dates;
•   can only be used for purchase a specified type of product.13 
11   The Ha-Mi Cooperative − as revealed in the conference entitled “Helyi pénz a helyi gazdaság erősítésére” (Local money to support the local economy) 
(held in Sopron, on 23 February 2011) − intends to reach issues in a total amount of HUF 100 million.
12 Resemblance to banknotes is meant in general terms and we do not mean they are imitations of specific forint banknotes.
13 The MNB has unofficial information about companies making payments to one another in hot-meal vouchers due to the high redemption costs.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Besides these differences, issuers of cafeteria vouchers 
themselves  “manage others’ money”, therefore the 
deficiencies in regulatory framework described above also 
apply to them (with the weight of risk categories differing 
in the two cases).
ii. Credit risk
With the annual turnover in cafeteria vouchers in all 
likelihood exceeding HUF 100 billion, the associated credit 
risk is of material extent (in the magnitude of HUF 10 
billion)14 and economic actors would suffer considerable 
losses in the case of the bankruptcy of an issuer of cafeteria 
vouchers. No information is available as to how the issuer 
of the trade voucher manages the amounts transferred by 
employers (in government bonds, bank deposits, etc.) 
before payment of the amount to entities accepting the 
vouchers. Due to lack of applicable legislation it is 
reasonable to assume that these issuers act in accordance 
with the relevant policy elaborated by them.
iii. Risk of forgery
We have no official data at our disposal regarding the 
forgery of cafeteria vouchers. These vouchers are also 
characterised by considerable turnover, widespread 
acceptance, less advanced technical layout as compared to 
banknotes and less severe sentences when an offender is 
caught forging such vouchers. At the same time, an 
argument against forgery lies in the typically small 
denominations (to our knowledge these include: HUF 200, 
300 and 500) of such cafeteria vouchers, as banknotes 
themselves are forged in their large denominations. 
ReGulAtiONS ON “lOCAl MONieS” 
AND vOuCHeRS iN HuNGARy
In the chapter on trade vouchers, we described how the 
holders of “local money” vouchers and cafeteria vouchers 
bear credit risks vis-à-vis the issuers of these vouchers. This 
means that under such schemes, the issuer is engaged in 
service provision that should be subject to prudential 
supervision (as the primary activity of such issuer in 
essence covers “management of others’ money” and issue 
of cash substitutes). However, the relevant EU Directive15 
removes this activity from the scope of money transaction 
services and thus the scope of prudential supervision 
(unless performed electronically).
Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council had to be adopted in EU Member States by 1 
November 2009. The content of the various financial 
services are described in Annex 2 to the Act on Credit 
Institutions and Financial Enterprises. Pursuant to Article 9 
(1) (g) of the Annex, payment by paper-based trade 
vouchers shall neither be deemed as a financial service, nor 
shall such trade vouchers be included on the list of cash 
substitutes. Trade vouchers are not regulated in any other 
statutory legislation (and even the definition of such trade 
vouchers is missing from Hungarian legislation).
When somebody buys a trade voucher, that person 
exchanges an asset of unlimited acceptance under the law 
to an asset of limited acceptance. For “local money” 
vouchers, this means that payment by such trade vouchers 
is to be regarded as fulfilment of a payment obligation if 
the parties have preliminarily come to an agreement to this 
effect.
The risks associated with cafeteria vouchers are significantly 
higher in terms of the amount involved than risks associated 
with “local monies”, as such trade vouchers are used by a 
wide range of employees (even millions of people) due to 
the tax allowance on these trade vouchers, and accordingly, 
bankruptcy of an issuer would inflict considerable damage 
to the economy.
CONCluSiON
“Local money” initiatives are launched with the express 
objective of promoting the local economy, to be attained as 
credit-based money. As we have demonstrated, in 1970 (in 
the case of the forint, in 1982) the gold standard was 
eliminated and therefore legal tender is also credit-based 
money. “Local monies”, therefore, do not have any extra 
feature in addition to the features of current legal tenders 
that could facilitate fulfilment of the objectives of issuers, 
which however are regarded as very positive.
The issuers’ reasoning is marred by a number of 
misconceptions, such as:
•   Only “local money” will remain in the local economy − both 
Hungarian and foreign research has confirmed that monetary 
ties are becoming less significant with the increase of 
distance between business partners; at the same time, 
50-70% of money will not leave a particular area;
14   As the employer pays in advance, the employee does not use all the vouchers same day, and the merchant receives his/her money after 10 days delay 
we estimate that the credit risk is roughly equal to the vouchers issued in one month.
15 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 13 November 2007.MNB BulletiN • April 2011 43
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•   the economy has an inadequate supply of cash, which 
prevents it from growing − central banks, such as the 
MNB, are capable of meeting demands on a continuous 
basis and are prepared to meet increased demand.
Although unprecedented in Hungary, there are “local 
monies” abroad (especially in Germany) that promote 
consumption and are devalued on a continuous basis; 
however, the German central bank has revealed that 
widespread application of the scheme would result in 
considerable welfare losses. “Local monies" in Hungary are 
also in use at a high assumed rate of administration costs, 
which may render them a loss-generating business enterprise 
for issuers and participants. 
Worldwide, there are a number of “local money” initiatives 
up and running; however, with no positive impact to be 
documented. In contrast, an opposing process can be 
observed: the appearance of monies used by a number of 
countries jointly (monetary union) promotes the removal of 
trade barriers, thereby contributing to the growth of 
welfare. The closest example is the euro, which − according 
to expert studies − has clearly contributed to increased 
competitiveness of the European Economic Area; as revealed 
by analysis of the MNB, the introduction of the euro in 
Hungary would add an annual 0.6-0.9% to GDP.
“Local monies” have taken the form of trade vouchers, 
which became widely known in Hungary in the form of meal 
vouchers and recreation vouchers under a favourable tax 
regime. Trade vouchers, however, are not regulated under 
legislation and therefore the holders of such trade vouchers 
bear risks, which − due to lack of regulations and prudential 
supervision − is only limited by the self-constraint of 
issuers.
We do not deem the spread of “local monies” likely, due to 
the high transaction costs and non-materialisation of 
expected benefits (as supported by international 
experience). At the same time, the risks associated with 
cafeteria vouchers may affect millions of employees.
Based on the foregoing, we suggest that the regulatory 
authorities formulate regulations on trade vouchers, as a 
result of which prudent operation on the part of issuers 
would be more than voluntary and the risks borne by clients 
could be reduced considerably.
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